

UNAMID: A CASE STUDY

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNAMID: A CASE STUDY

by

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ABSTRACT

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In 2007, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769 established the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This single mission deployed under the same mandate troops from the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) to support the peace process in DARFUR/SUDAN. Among the current missions, UNAMID is unique because the UN and the AU share the responsibilities a propos the mission`s failure or success.

Is UNAMID enough? My research addresses that question. To answer it I analyzed the role of UNAMID in the current environment considering the political, tactical and strategic domains. This paper highlights the strong points and weaknesses of the ongoing strategy and offers some ideas to improve the performance of UNAMID in the field.

UNAMID: A CASE STUDY

Organization of African Unity Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which, in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.¹

—Salim Ahmed Salim
African Union Special Envoy for Darfur

In October 2008, in his report to the Security Council a propos the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSYG) – Mr. Ban Ki-moon – called attention to the current situation in Darfur. He said:

More than a year after the Security Council authorized the deployment of UNAMID under resolution 1769 (2007), conditions required for an effective peacekeeping operation remain absent in Darfur. The Government and the parties continue to pursue a military solution to the conflict, while little progress has been made in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. As violence prevails, the protection of civilians remains a grave concern.²

Why? Are the UN – AU hybrid approach (one of the "WAYS") and the available resources (the "MEANS") appropriate to resolve Darfur's crisis (the "ENDS")? Is UNAMID sufficient or not? Those questions drive my project. To answer them, my methodology was to conduct bibliographic research and analysis using the sources available on-line and in hard copy. Concerning the sources, I need to offer a caveat. Multiple sources are readily available. Because of that, selecting among them and assessing their value were the most difficult parts of my work.

This paper has five elements or parts. The first is an overview of the Darfur crisis and the root of the conflict. The next three highlight the most important aspects with reference to political, tactical and strategic considerations regarding the ongoing Darfur

crisis and the role of UNAMID in that complex environment. Finally, I will offer my response to the questions identified in the purpose statement and recommend some ideas to improve the African Union/ United Nations hybrid approach to Darfur.

Background

In April 2003, the current crisis in Darfur erupted. The trigger was a set of attacks carried out by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) against government military posts in Darfur. The most relevant attack was against the military garrison in the El Fasher airport. The rebel group surprised the soldiers, destroyed aircraft, captured relevant military equipment and arrested the base commander, General Bushra Isma`il.

The Government of Sudan (GoS) started to meet that challenge with a destructive response. The focus was not only the rebel movements but also the civilian population from the same ethnic groups as the rebels (Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) and their villages³. As a result, according to many analysts, Darfur was transformed into a killing field. M. W. Daly in *Darfur's Sorrow: a History of Destruction and Genocide* described in detail the GoS operational behavior:

.... old transport planes with open rear ramps flew low over targeted villages and rolled out barrels filled with explosives and shrapnel. Helicopter gunships or jet fighters would follow, destroying buildings with rockets or heavy machine-gun fire. Ground forces – *janjawid* on horseback or camels or in “technicals”, or soldiers in trucks, or a combined force – would then surround the settlement and move in.⁴

In 2004, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch confirmed the attack pattern described by Daly and added that more than 110,000 Zaghawa and Masaalit refugees crossed the Chadian border and at least 750,000 persons, many of them Fur, remained displaced in Darfur.⁵ The humanitarian situation

in Darfur declined drastically and international public opinion classified the events in Darfur as “genocide”.

In April 2004, the GoS and rebel movements (SLA/M and JEM), supported by the African Union, established a cease fire agreement. As a result, the African Union deployed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) the following June. The purpose of AMIS was to monitor the cease fire agreement, protect the civilians and disarm the *Janjaweed*.

The AMIS forces did not prove capable of accomplishing the humanitarian mission foreseen. The AMIS troops’ performance on the ground was not sufficiently robust to protect civilians in many cases or to disarm the *Janjaweed*. Even worse, the AMIS forces were not capable of protecting themselves. The following numbers cited by Patrick Paterson in his article “Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa” support this point: 32 peacekeepers had been killed, 69 aid workers had been abducted, 37 relief convoys had been attacked and 61 humanitarian vehicles hijacked in the period from 2004 to 2007. In his article, Paterson discussed the reason behind the AMIS performance and pointed out the following causes: lack of military capabilities (communication, logistical support, and intelligence) and corruption. As a result, AMIS credibility was poor.⁶

After a difficult and incomplete Peace Talks Process, in Abuja, on 5 May 2006, the GoS and only one of the many rebels factions, the SLM/A (Minawi), signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). However, on the ground the situation did not improve. The fighting among DPA signatories and non-signatories persisted and the civilian population continued to suffer the consequences of that fact.

Since 2004, the debate in relation to the Darfur crisis has been ongoing within the United Nations. However, just in 2006, motivated by the humanitarian situation on the ground, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) took what appeared to be decisive action and approved UNSCR 1706. That resolution expanded the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was established in 2005 to oversee implementation of the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (CPA) between the GoS and rebels who had waged a rebellion in southern Sudan for over 20 years, to include Darfur. The Sudanese President – Mr Omar Hassan al-Bashir – blocked the implementation process, arguing that United Nations troops in Darfur would represent a neo-colonialist approach. As a result, the situation in Darfur remained calamitous, without an effective international response. Finally, after intensive diplomacy and international community pressure, Khartoum reduced its opposition and accepted an African Union – United Nations hybrid force. On 31 July 2007 the UNSC passed resolution 1769 and authorized the UNAMID deployment.

Since 2004, Darfur has been the focus of international peacekeeping efforts. However, as United Nations Secretary General Ban-Ki-moon observed in the report cited above, fighting in Darfur continues, innocent civilians still suffer, UNAMID and humanitarian personnel are under threat and the parties have failed to pursue a political solution.⁷

Why? To address that question, the roots of the Darfur crisis need to be understood.

First of all, the conflict in Darfur is neither an exclusively religious nor solely an ethnic conflict. According to Jok Madut Jok, in contrast to the North – South conflict⁸, in

Darfur the executed and the executioners are all Muslims⁹. Some scholars try to explain the current crises in Darfur as an ethnic conflict between Arabs (herders) and non-Arabs (farmers). That characterization lacks accuracy for the following reasons: (a) the Arabs arrived in Darfur in the fourteenth century and lived together, even intermarried, with the indigenous population for centuries; in Darfur the ethnic boundaries exist more in name than in reality; and (b) disputes between the herders and the farmers were resolved through negotiation between traditional leaders on both sides, compensation for lost crops, and agreements on timing and routes for annual migrations¹⁰. That point highlighted by Human Rights Watch is supported by an article entitled “*Darfur: A Conflict for Land?*” written by Jerome Tubiana.¹¹

During the 1980s, the cyclical drought motivated a new conflict in Darfur – the “War of the Tribes” – between farmers and herders. At the same time, Libya and Chad provided automatic weapons to the groups that they backed, which changed the nature of the armed conflicts in Darfur. However, the reason behind the clashes was still economic. The groups fought among themselves for resources (water holes and pasturelands).

In his article cited above, Jerome Tubiana argues that the root of the current crisis in Darfur is the disagreement about land property. He makes the following arguments: (a) land was the central object of contention during the Abuja Peace Talks; (b) human sources for the *Janjaweed* are the Arab tribes without land rights; and (c) the rebel movements find human resources in non-Arab (Fur and Zaghawa) displaced communities.

Jok Madut Jok takes another interesting approach to the roots of the Darfur crisis. Jok explain the conflict in Darfur as a conflict between center (Khartoum) and periphery (Darfurians) where the Darfurians were marginalized in the economic development process and excluded from the power structure. Independent of the political party in charge, Khartoum strategy in relation to Darfur was to exploit the tension among the various ethnic groups. In Jok`s words: the current crisis is a result of the government`s desire to maintain the racial divide as a governing asset.¹²

Finally, considering the arguments above, it can be concluded that the roots of the current conflict in Darfur are in the economic (resources) and political (power distribution) domains. In October 2008, during a seminar organized by the Institute for Security Studies, General Martin Luther Agwai – the UNAMID Force Commander – highlighted that the seeds of the current crisis in Darfur were economics and politics.¹³ The reasons for the conflict are not ethnic or religious, as some scholars believe. The ethnic issues are used by the GoS as a “MEANS” inside of the tactical domain. Khartoum stresses Arab supremacy and makes use of the *Janjaweed* as a weapon. That understanding is relevant to the search for resolution of the ongoing crisis because it will provide the guidance for the employment of the resources available.

Political Considerations

Which are the relevant political considerations a propos the Darfur crisis? Initially, internal and external actors as well as their interests in the enduring crisis must be identified, analyzed and correlated. Next, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and UNSCR 1769 will be studied and the strong and weak points highlighted because they

constitute the legal core for the peace process in Darfur. Those documents and players are the pillars for the Darfur political solution.

Who are the vital players in the Darfur contest? Internally, they are: the GoS, the rebel movements, the *Janjaweed* and the other political parties. The outsiders include: the African Union; the United Nations; Chad; China; Eritrea; Ethiopia; the International Criminal Court (ICC); Libya; and the United States. They will be analyzed in more detail below.

According to the International Crisis Group, the Government of Sudan represented by the National Congress Party (NCP) does not have political will to settle the conflict in Darfur. Its arguments are: (a) stability in Darfur would facilitate the creation of a political front among the Darfurians or including other political leadership like the SPLA/M, Umma Party or even the Popular Congress Party capable of confronting the NCP in the general elections scheduled for 2009; and (b) stability in Darfur would facilitate the International Criminal Court investigation a propos war crimes in Darfur and the subsequent arrest of current senior NCP leaders.¹⁴ As a result, the NCP undermines the DPA implementation and imposes a lot of constraints to limit UNAMID's role on the ground.

In 2003, the rebel groups in Darfur were the Sudan Liberation Movement/Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Nowadays, a host of factions have splintered and new groups emerged.¹⁵ Among them, the most important are: SLA/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM); SLA/Abdel Wahid (SLA/AW); SLA/Group of 19 (SLA/G19) and JEM. The SLA/MM, led by Minni Arkoy Minawi, is the sole rebel faction which is a DPA signatory. After signing the DPA, Minni Minawi was assigned as senior

assistant to President al-Bashir and Chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. Consequently, the cost of his close tie with the GoS was the loss of credibility and popularity inside Darfurian circles. The SLA/AW, led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur, is not in a good situation. The negative impact of the SLA/G19 defection was huge and the faction was not able to recover its military power. One important consideration a propos Abdel Wahid is his close and loyal relationship with the local Arabs and Fur leaders in Darfur. Consequently, Abdel Wahid is a potential leader capable of joining the Arabs and non-Arabs toward a common objective. The SLA/G19, led by Jar al Nebi, is an SLA/AW splinter. Now renamed SLA – Unity, that faction is one of the most powerful rebel groups in North Darfur and tries to impose its will, even over other rebel groups, by arms. Both SLA/AW and SLA/G19 have a strong political connection with the regime of President Idris Deby in Chad. According to the International Crisis Group, all SLA factions have a common political goal. They want more political representation on the national level, disarmament of the *Janjaweed* and more autonomy for Darfur. The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim, have the objective of overthrowing the al-Bashir regime. Like SLA/AW and SLA/G19, JEM has a strong link with Deby`s regime in Chad. Although without confirmation, Julie Flint in her article “Darfur`s Armed Movements” suggest that JEM is the armed wing of al-Turabi`s Popular Congress Party.¹⁶

The next relevant internal player is the *Janjaweed*. According to Ali Hangar, the current *Janjaweedism* in Darfur is a phenomenon where armed groups – Arabs and non-Arabs – backed by Khartoum – fight against the Darfurian rebel groups. Among them, the most important bands that act under the label *Janjaweed* are: *Quwat al*

Salaam; *Marahill* protection forces; *Anbaa* forces; *Um Bakha*; *Difaa al Sha`abi*, and *Shorta al Sha`abi*.¹⁷ Concerning the *Janjaweed*, the following clarification is critical: not all Arab tribes in Darfur supported the *Janjaweed* or the National Congress Party agenda behind it. Some Arabs have even joined the non-Arab rebel movements or created their own. In Southern Darfur, the Popular Forces Army is an example of the last case. Those bands do not have the political agenda, motivated by the *Janjaweed*'s ideology of Arab supremacy; they act like criminal gangs against the civilian population. In summary, they are bandits in service of Khartoum.

In Sudan, the relevant political opposition parties are: the Umma Party; the Communist Party and the Popular Congress Party. After 2005, the internal political game is played by the NCP and a fragile coalition that put together the Umma, Communist and Popular Congress Parties. Publicly, the coalition expresses grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Darfur and accepts a more robust Peacekeeping Force to protect the civilian population and stabilize the Chadian border. However, Sadiq al-Mahdi, Umma Party leader, and al-Turabi, Popular Congress Party chairman, have some responsibility for the Darfur crisis. Both al-Mahdi and al-Turabi, when in charge, kept the Darfurians excluded from the political game and managed internal policy to prevent Darfuri unity. The election scheduled for 2009 is vital for the opposition parties. The electoral result can threaten the political viability of any party. After sixteen years without elections, the parties are doubtful about their popular support. Consequently, they have tried to establish political alliances with the Darfuri rebel movements, without success. Until now, al-Bashir and his National Congress Party is the strongest political player in Sudan. That assumption can be supported by

the following facts: (a) the NCP dominates most state institutions and resources completely; and (b) there appears to be no political leadership able to overthrow al-Bashir by popular vote.

The analysis regarding outside players has its starting point with the African Union role in Darfur. In 2004, the African Union took up a role in the Darfur crisis – first as a sponsor for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, subsequently by providing a peacekeeping force on the ground. In their book *Darfur: a New History of a Long War*, Flint and Wall pointed out that the African Union became peacekeeper and peacemaker in Darfur by default, because no other organization would take on the challenge.¹⁸ That point lacks accuracy because, under the label – “AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS” – the African Union and the parties in conflict, mainly the GoS, impose a lot of constraints for non-African players. According to Festus Aboagye, the “foreigners” – non-African troops or those not under AU command – were not welcome.¹⁹ That restriction was an AU judgment mistake and a strategic goal for al-Bashir. The African Union – motivated by its “success” in Liberia (2003), Cote d’Ivoire (2003) and Burundi (2004) – underestimated the challenges in Darfur. The most relevant African Union interest in Darfur is to show for the world its capability in dealing with African problems. Darfur has been an honor question for the AU because its international credibility is on the line.

The role of United Nations in the Darfur crisis must be considered in two phases: the Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon administrations. Until the end of 2006, the UN was unable to mobilize the international community to respond efficiently to face the Darfur crisis. The reasons were: (a) the position of China, the most important Sudan supporter,

inside the Security Council; and (b) the lack of political will from United Nations Member States to take more robust action regarding the Darfur crisis. Secretary-General Kofi Annan devoted considerable attention to the Darfur issue and played an instrumental role in gaining Khartoum's tentative acceptance of an AU/UN "hybrid" operation at a meeting he convened in Addis Ababa in November 2006. After taking office at the beginning of 2007, Mr Ban Ki-moon recognized the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the related implementation of the hybrid peacekeeping plan as top priorities. He adopted a soft diplomatic approach²⁰, criticized by some state members that wanted more sanctions against Khartoum and step by step alongside Mr Jan Eliasson and Mr Salim Ahmed Salim – respectively UN and AU Special Envoy on Darfur – removed the political constraints a propos a UN – AU Peacekeeping Force for Darfur. As a result of extensive diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and many other key international actors, on 31 July 2007 the Security Council approved resolution 1769 that authorized UNAMID deployment. The United Nations interests in Darfur are to: (1) contain the political conflict; (b) solve the humanitarian crisis; and (c) strengthen the institution.

In 2005, the Commission of Inquiry in Darfur – established in 2004 by the UN Secretary-General and supported by UNSCR 1564 – reported to the Security Council that the situation in Darfur represented genocide and recommended prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC) of the perpetrators. Consequently, by UNSCR 1593 the Security Council authorized the ICC to begin the investigation process. Khartoum behavior has been characterized for its lack of cooperation. In 2007, the ICC issued warrants of arrest against Ahmad Harun (GoS Minister) and Ali Mohamed (*Janjaweed*

leader) for crimes against humanity, and on 14 July 2008 the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo requested the warrant of arrest for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. According to the International Crisis Group, the political impact of ICC legal actions put at risk the fragile peace and security environment in Sudan.²¹ For the ICC, more than arrest of the senior Sudanese leaders, the goal is to protect the credibility of the Court.

Although U. S. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell had classified the crisis in Darfur as genocide, Darfur and Sudan as a whole have never been among the very highest priorities for U.S. diplomacy²². However, the U.S. has a vital national interest – to deny safe havens for terrorist groups – inside the region. The U.S. also maintains a strong interest in preventing mass atrocities and providing relief to victims of humanitarian crises throughout the world. That dichotomy – lack of priority and strong, even vital, interests – put in evidence one contradiction in U. S. National Security Strategy. In 2008, the U.S. sought a new political approach to Khartoum and emphasized the following actions: (a) President Bush named a new Special Envoy to Sudan; (b) the U.S. continued to support the AU – UN joint efforts to promote the full implementation of the DPA; (c) the U.S. recognized China as an important player in Sudan and sought to enlist its assistance in resolving the crisis, particularly in the run-up to the Beijing Olympic Games held in the summer of 2008; (d) the U.S. increased USAID participation in humanitarian efforts; and (e) the U.S. provided limited military support to UNAMID. On 13 January 2009, Mrs. Hillary Clinton – the next Secretary of State – pointed out in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

that the solution for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur would be a priority for the Obama administration.

China has been the Sudanese government's most important ally. Since 1996, Beijing has had close political, economic and military ties with Khartoum. According to David Shinn, China is one of Sudan's most important suppliers of military equipment²³. As a result, the Chinese influence over the GoS is impressive. For example, only President Hu Jintao was capable of convincing al-Bashir to adopt somewhat more flexible behavior and accept the UNAMID deployment. China's national interest in Sudan is primarily economic. Consequently, a politically unstable Sudan can threaten Chinese business.

Several of Sudan's neighbors – Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya – have specific roles and national interest in Darfur. However, stability is of interest to all of them because one unstable country like Sudan can spread its instability to the neighboring regions, including the Horn of Africa. For the period from 2008 through 2009, Libya is a member of the UNSC and has been an active player on the Darfur issue. Recently, Muammar al-Qadhafi, the Libyan President, was elected Chairman of the African Union. Qadhafi has tried to use the current situation in Darfur in search of prestige among African and Arabic countries. Chad is the natural safe haven for Darfur refugees. In 2007, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there were approximately 236,651 Darfurian refugees in Internal Displacement Camps in Chad. For Chad, the return of those refugees to Darfur is vital for its internal stability. Historically, the relationship between Sudan and Eritrea has always been complex. Both have supported rebel groups inside other countries. After the North – South agreement and

with the SPLA alongside NCP, Eritrea has sought to build a good relationship with the GoS because of Sudanese oil and to counterbalance Addis Ababa's influence over Khartoum. For Ethiopia, Sudan is a natural ally against Eritrea. In search of prestige, together with the GoS and to brake the relationship among Eritrea and Sudanese rebel groups, Ethiopia has been an important troop contributor for UNAMID.

The legal foundation for the peace process in Darfur is composed of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769. On 5 May 2006, after an exhaustive negotiation process sponsored by the African Union and United Nations, the GoS and SLA/MM signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. Its guidelines are: (a) build a security environment; (b) rehabilitation of the Darfurian displaced population; and (c) create an inclusive political environment. The lack of GoS political will has been the most relevant constraint preventing full implementation of the DPA. For example, Khartoum has not been engaging in disarmament of the *Janjaweed*, which would be a cornerstone to build a security environment. Consequently, the situation on the ground did not get better. According to the International Crisis Group, the DPA has failed because it did not adequately deal with key issues, too few insurgents signed it, and there has been little buy-in from Darfur society, which was not sufficiently represented in the negotiations.²⁴ The strong point of the DPA was bring to the light the discussion a propos an inclusive political environment. However, the poor unity of effort among the rebel groups – reflected by the number of non-signatory movements – hampered the peace process. In spite of the problems for its implementation; the Darfur Peace Agreement opened the door for more effective

participation of the United Nations – even with troops – inside the Darfurian humanitarian crisis.

In fact, the first United Nations tentative decision to place troops in Darfur was by UNSCR 1706, approved on 31 August 2006. However, its implementation failed because Sudan, the host nation, resisted accepting the U.N. troops. One year later, after a new diplomatic process where China played a prominent role, Khartoum changed its behavior and accepted – under several constraints – the deployment of UNAMID. UNSCR 1769, approved on 31 July 2007, authorized UNAMID to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, established the maximum strength of 19,555 military personnel and 6,432 police personnel, and set up a broad task package for UNAMID. The UNAMID mandate emphasized three more aspects: (a) the solution for Darfur is political; (b) unity of command; and, (c) the troop providers would mainly be African countries. In synthesis, the UNAMID is supported by a broad and robust mandate.

Before discussing the other domains, some political points must be highlighted: (a) supported by the arguments presented, President al-Bashir and his NCP will probably win the next elections; (b) as demonstrated above, China is the most important external player; and (c) except for limiting the force providers, as discussed below, the UNAMID mandate is sufficient.

Tactical Considerations

The discussion regarding the UNAMID tactical domain brings to light two points: first, the force generation process; and second, the troops' military capabilities. Both

suffer grave impacts by the following preambular paragraph extracted from UNSCR

1769:

Recalling the Addis Ababa Agreement that the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries²⁵

That condition contradicts the following recommendation from “Brahimi Report”²⁶,
a thorough review of United Nations Peacekeeping led by the senior Algerian diplomat
Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000:

For peacekeeping to accomplish its mission, as the United Nations discovered repeatedly over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force.²⁷

On 31 December 2008, UNAMID had 15,136 troops and police on the ground.
This represents only 58% of the maximum strength authorized by UNSCR 1769²⁸. The
Table 1 below presents the UNAMID deployment evolution during 2008:

	Military Personnel	Police Personnel	Total	
April	7,521	1,716	9,237	35%
August	8,492	1,845	10,337	39%
December	12,369	2,767	15,136	58%

Table 1 – Evolution of the UNAMID deployment

Either because of political constraints or tactical considerations, UNAMID force generation has been a complicated process. In August 2008, more than one year after the resolution, UNAMID had less than 40% of its maximum strength deployed. Until December 2008, just 58% of UNAMID was on the ground.²⁹ Why?

Daniel et al, in *Distinguishing among Military Contributors*³⁰ analyzed the societal characteristics of the 157 potential contributors for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. They used one discrimination criteria where the lowest score was 5 (five), representing the most developed countries and the highest score was 15 (fifteen),

representing the countries with the great development problems. They considered the following aspects: governance, wealth, stability, development and connectivity (internet). The most important UNAMID contributors – according to the Table 2 – have the following classification: Bangladesh (12), Egypt (11), Ethiopia (14), Nigeria (14), Rwanda (15), Senegal (11) and South Africa (8).

	Military Personnel	Police Personnel	Total	
Bangladesh	379	227	606	4%
Egypt	1,398	55	1,453	9%
Ethiopia	1,479	-	1,479	10%
Nigeria	3,256	548	3,804	25%
Rwanda	3,248	73	3,321	22%
Senegal	566	36	602	4%
South Africa	639	158	797	5%
Total	10,965	1,097	12,062	79%

Table 2 – Most important UNAMID contributors on 31 December 2008

Except for South Africa, the other countries are very close on the underdevelopment index. That situation has a negative impact on military capabilities because those countries are clearly unable, in many cases, to deploy and sustain troops without external support.

To assess the Daniel argument a propos the impact of countries` development levels on military capabilities, it is interesting to analyze the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployment rate after the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1701, an August 2006 resolution which authorized an increase in UNIFIL from 2,000 to 15,000 troops. Table 3 shows the most important contributors for the process and their increasing rate during five following months after the resolution.

	August	September	October	November	December
Troops	2,219	5,147	8,741	10,884	11,563
Contributor					
Belgium	01	161	365	358	375
France	432	1,531	1,653	1,593	1,617
Germany	-	-	933	912	903
Indonesia	-	-	-	850	850
Italy	53	1,074	1,512	2,206	2,415
Spain	4	614	1,393	1,280	1,277
Turkey	-	-	-	494	509
	490 / 22%	3380 / 65%	5856 / 67%	7693 / 70%	7946 / 68%

Table 3 – The most important UNIFIL contributors on 31 December 2006

On December 2006, five months after the UNSCR the number of “boots on the ground” increased five times. According to *Distinguishing among Military Contributors*, the contributors above have the following classification: Belgium (5), France (5), Germany (5), Indonesia (11), Italy (5), Spain (5) and Turkey (10). Except for Indonesia and Turkey, these are among the world's most highly developed countries. The impact of the development index on the force generation process can be proved by the tables above.

Since July 2007, before the UNAMID deployment, Mr. Ban Ki-moon has expressed in his personal reports to the Security Council a grave concern a propos the military capabilities of the peacekeeping troops in Darfur. He has repeatedly requested Member States to provide the necessary force. According to Ban Ki-moon, in Darfur the critical capabilities are inside the logistical domain. They are: airlift, engineering, medical and transportation capabilities.

In his article *Preparing for the Worst: Military Requirements for Hazardous Missions*, Gary Anderson pointed out the critical military capabilities for modern

peacekeeping operations: helicopters; night operations; advanced urban operations; air protection and air defense; and counterinsurgency.

Ban Ki-moon and Anderson have different approaches. The first highlights the logistical domain and the second the operational domain. Which are the relevant militaries capabilities for UNAMID?

UNAMID on the ground is faced with huge logistical tasks. In Darfur, the infrastructure is poor, the transportation facilities are deplorable, and the local resources non-existent. Those facts worsened by implacable weather cause UNAMID to be an impressive logistical challenge. Consequently, just deploying and sustaining troops inside Darfur is a tremendous job.

Operationally, UNAMID has as its priority the protection of the civilian population. Inside one large operational environment – Darfur is the same size as France – without a transportation net, two operational capabilities emerge in importance: surveillance and inter-theater aviation assets (fixed and rotary wings). According to General Martin Luther Agwai, without helicopters the operations is doomed to fail.³¹ The forces of UNAMID`s potential adversaries lack high technological devices. As a result, their performance in command and control and night operations is poor. To exploit that vulnerability, a force able to conduct night operations would have a relevant advantage.

Consistent with the arguments above, UNAMID must be able to control and project power – night and day – inside the whole area of operations. This suggests the need for an efficient Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system and a Rapid Reaction Force.

The capabilities – logistical and operational – cited above are intensive in technology. They are available in developed countries. According to *Distinguishing among Military Contributors*, the majority of UNAMID contributors are African countries with a low level of development. Consequently, those capabilities are not available for them.

Inside the tactical domain, UNAMID is in trouble because it is not able to project a robust force posture quickly. The numbers of “boots on the ground” is currently sufficient but the lack of critical logistical and operational capabilities remains insoluble.

Strategic Considerations

In any discussion about UNAMID’s strategic domain the following questions should be addressed: (a) What is the Center of Gravity in the Darfur crisis?; (b) What does the hybrid approach mean?; and (c) How have the instruments of national power been applied?

According to Clausewitz, Center of Gravity is the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.³² That is the concept utilized in this paper.

The political and tactical considerations analyses allow us to conclude that the Center of Gravity is the current GoS. In synthesis, President al-Bashir and his National Congress Party are the keystones for the contemporary ongoing crisis. The following arguments support that statement: (a) the nature of the crisis in Darfur is political and economic; (b) after twenty years in charge, al-Bashir with his National Congress Party is the strongest political player in Sudan; (c) the National Congress Party controls the national Sudanese power structure across the full spectrum, (d) since 2005, after the

death of John Garang³³, no one in the other political parties in Sudan has demonstrated any likelihood of threatening to overcome al-Bashir in the next elections; (e) al-Bashir's political behavior regarding the AU and UN imposes several constraints limiting UNAMID on the ground; and (f) Khartoum has strong political support from China. Consequently, in one broad approach, President al-Bashir and the National Congress Party are the Center of Gravity not just regarding Darfur but in relation to the Sudan crisis as a whole.

On the subject of the hybrid approach – the current strategic way – the baseline is to understand what it means. According to Festus Aboagye, the lack of a common, acceptable definition and understanding of what a hybrid operation is could be partly responsible for the impasse over the hybrid operation in Darfur.³⁴

Thus far, there is not a universally accepted definition of the hybrid operation. However, the ideas below proposed by Festus Aboagye offered a guideline for an initial understanding: (a) joint multinational and/or multidisciplinary operation in a specific area of operations; (b) conducted by forces from different organizations and/or states each with its own mandate; (c) under different Status of Forces or Missions Agreements (SOFA/SOMA); (d) with different rules of engagement; (e) each under the command and control of its respective mandating authority; (f) each retaining its organization's identity throughout the operation; and (g) each undertaking different functional missions and tasks.³⁵

The ideas put forward by Aboagye are drawn from his personal observation of African Union experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. In Darfur, the hybrid approach was different. Fortunately, UNSCR 1769 emphasized unity of

command and unity of effort. Consequently, UNAMID is not inside the framework proposed by Aboagye`s model because only the ideas included under (a) and, partially, (b) are echoed in UNAMID`s mandate. In fact, UNAMID on the ground is like a multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation under several constraints imposed by Khartoum.

How have the instruments of national power been applied? Since 2003, a lot of players have been trying to deal with the crisis in Darfur. The process has been confused and characterized by the lack of the unity of effort. Diplomatically, just after Ban Ki-moon became the United Nations Secretary General and declared Darfur to be his personal priority, the process was revitalized. Inside the diplomatic domain, Ban Ki-moon`s personal efforts together with Chinese diplomatic pressure were among the key factors that changed Khartoum behavior and resulted in the approval of UNSCR 1769.

Alongside diplomatic actions, Information efforts have been important tools for dealing with the Darfur crisis. Strategic Communication brought to light the crisis and mobilized the International Community toward a humanitarian solution for Darfur. Consequently, the Darfur crisis swung from the internal to the external arena and the pressure on Khartoum increased. The main Strategic Communication goal was the international mobilization toward China`s behavior in Sudan. Under pressure from the International Community, and concerned by a possible international boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games, China put pressure on al-Bashir to accept a UN Peacekeeping Force in Darfur.

The military component of national power is represented by AMIS and UNAMID peacekeepers. AMIS and UNAMID have suffered a lot of criticism about their poor

performance on the ground. According to General Agwai, AMIS was successful because its efforts created conditions for peace. Otherwise, he pointed out that UNAMID is in trouble because it was deployed in an environment without peace to keep. There is a dichotomy in Agwai's ideas concerning AMIS success and UNAMID challenges. In reality, both AMIS in the past and the ongoing UNAMID have lacked adequate military capabilities to deal with a complex mission like Darfur. However, in spite of their tactical problems, both have made a substantial contribution for the civilian population in their deployment stations.

The economic issues are vital for Darfur and Sudan. Economic sanctions – a negative approach – against Sudan are inefficient because there is no consensus inside the International Community. For example, Sudan has been under U. S. economic sanctions for more than a decade without concrete result. There are two other negative points with reference to the effect of economic sanctions on the Darfur crisis. First of all, comprehensive economic sanctions would have a negative impact on the people in Darfur and in Sudan. Second, while economic sanctions targeted specifically against the Khartoum leadership could be useful over the long term, Darfur requires a short term response.

Conclusion

Two questions are addressed by this project: (a) Are the UN – AU hybrid approach (one of the "WAYS") and the available resources (the "MEANS") appropriate to resolve Darfur's crisis (the "ENDS")? And (b) Is UNAMID sufficient or not? The answers for both are negative.

A propos the UN – AU hybrid approach, the problem is not the concept as it was stressed by Festus Aboagye in his paper – “The hybrid operation for Darfur: a critical review of the concept of the mechanism” – cited earlier. The real challenge is the international community’s inability thus far to address the shortfall in critical military capabilities on the ground and the several constraints imposed by Khartoum.

According to the “Brahimi Report,” the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with robust posture and a sound peace-building strategy.³⁶ Since 2007, UNAMID failed to follow that golden rule.

UNAMID is not sufficient because is unable to act on the Center of Gravity of the Darfur crisis. Darfur is a part of the ongoing Sudanese political and economic crisis. Consequently, a solution for Darfur requires a solution for Sudan as a whole. UNAMID is a narrow approach to solve the Sudanese crisis but is capable of mitigating the negative impacts inside Darfur and for the Darfurian population.

What to do?

Diplomatically, the UN – AU will focus on the GoS, mainly al-Bashir, to seek a behavior change. China has an important role inside the diplomatic domain because of its capacity to influence Khartoum. The UNSC has the authority under the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, to suspend the ICC’s action against al-Bashir. That fact could be a relevant trump card in the diplomatic game because it can be used to obtain more flexible behavior from GoS.

The Strategic Communication effort is useful to keep light on the humanitarian situation in Darfur. During the entire process, to strengthen the International

Organizations engaged, the goals achieved need to be published and highlighted inside and outside Sudan.

The role of UNAMID is to create a stable and safe environment in Darfur. In practical words it means: protect the civilian population and disarm the *Janjaweed*. To accomplish that task efficiently the “Blue Helmets” must be able to project – day and night – a strong and credible force in the whole of Darfur. Consequently, the lack of rapid deployment capabilities needs to be solved and the political constraints removed.

Inside the economic domain, after the failures of economic sanctions, a positive approach – through economic incentives – is the recommendable course of action. Economic stability in Sudan is the base line for an effective and durable peace process.

In conclusion, Darfur needs a broader and deeper strategy, involving all the instruments of national and international power, able to act on the Center of Gravity. As the nature of the crisis is political and economic, resolving the crisis will require a robust political approach where diplomatic and economic actions will be the main effort – leading the process and the role of military and informational instruments supporting the course of action will be less intense.

Endnotes

¹ Address by Salim Ahmed Salim, then secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in 1997 at the Second Meeting of the Defense Staff of Members States of the OAU.

² United Nations Security Council, S/2008/659, Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur, 17 October 2008.

³ For a better understanding a propos the abuses by GoS and Janjaweed in West Darfur, mainly in Dar Masalit, check Human Right Watch, *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government of Sudan and Militia Forces in Western Sudan*, vol. 16, No. 6(A), May 2004.

⁴ M. W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: a History of Destruction and Genocide*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 283. As described later in this paper, the "janjiwid" (or "Janjaweed") are militias which are not formally subordinate to the GoS but which have been armed by the GoS and have been reported by multiple reliable sources to be responsible for carrying out many of the most brutal attacks against civilians in Darfur.

⁵ Human Right Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan*, vol. 16, No. 5(A), April 2004.

⁶ Patrick Paterson, *Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, *Military Review*, Jul/Ago 2008, 14-23.

⁷ United Nations Security Council, S/2008/781, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations in Darfur, 12 October 2008.

⁸ For this paper, the North – South Conflict is the war started in 1983 between the GoS and Sudanese People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) led by John Garang.

⁹ Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*, Oxford, UK: One World Publications, 2007, 120.

¹⁰ Human Right Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan*, 6-7.

¹¹ Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur: a Conflict for Land?", in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. by Alex de Wall, Harvard University, 2007, 68 – 91.

¹² Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*, 122.

¹³ Institute for Security Studies, *The AU-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur: A Force Commander Perspective on the Pitfalls, Challenges and Prospects of Mandate Implementation in a Complex Mission*, Pretoria, 1 October 2008.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, *Darfur: revitalizing the peace process*, Africa Report, No. 125, Apr 2007, 06.

¹⁵ For a better understanding a propos the splinters from SLM/A and JEM consult International Crisis Group, *Darfur: revitalizing the peace process*, Africa Report, No. 125, April 2007, 30.

¹⁶ Julie Flint, "Darfur's Armed Movement", in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. by Alex de Wall, Harvard University, 2007, 140 – 172.

¹⁷ Ali Hangar, "The Origins and Organization of the *Janjaweed* in Darfur", in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. by Alex de Wall, Harvard University, 2007, 113 – 139.

¹⁸ Julie Flint and Alex de Wall, *Darfur: a new history of a long war*, New York, NY: Zed Books, 2008, 173.

¹⁹ Festus Aboagye, *The hybrid operation for Darfur: a critical review of the concept of the mechanism*, ISS Paper, No. 149, August 2007, 8.

²⁰ On 2 April 2007 Mr Ban Ki-moon made the following statement: “My position at this time is that, before we talk about sanctions, let me have some more political space to deal this dialogue with them”.

²¹ International Crisis Group, New ICC Prosecution: Opportunities and Risks for Peace in Sudan, July 2008; available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm> (accessed January 18, 2009). On 4 March 2009, the ICC accepted the prosecutor’s recommendation and issued a warrant for the arrest of President Bashir. The consequences of this decision, the first ICC arrest warrant issued against a sitting head of state, fall outside the time-frame of this study.

²² The post of Ambassador in Khartoum has been vacant since June 2007.

²³ David H. Shinn, Africa, China, the United States, and Oil, Africa Policy Forum, May 8th, 2007; available from <http://forums.csis.org/africa> (accessed 18 January 2009)

²⁴ International Crisis Group, Darfur: revitalizing the peace process, i.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007.

²⁶ In 2000, motivated by disasters that occurred in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, and their negative impacts on the Member States, the United Nations established a high-level Panel to review the United Nations peace activities. The intention of this panel was: (a) identify the reasons behind the failures; and (b) to propose a clear set of practical recommendations to avoid similar problems. The final report of this panel – known as the “Brahimi Report” – had a deep impact on Peace Operations because it pointed out that the environment had changed. The label “Brahimi Report” makes a reference to the name of Lakhdar Brahimi – former Foreign Minister of Algeria – the Panel chairman.

²⁷ United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), August 21st, 2000.

²⁸ According to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769, the UNAMID maximum strength is 19,555 military personnel (troops and military observers) and 6,432 police.

²⁹ On 31 July 2008, the UNSC by resolution 1828 established December 2008 as the deadline for 80% of UNAMID to be deployed.

³⁰ Donald C. F. Daniel, et al, “Distinguish among Military Contributors”, in *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress and Prospects*, ed. by Donald C. F. Daniel, et al, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 27 – 46.

³¹ Institute for Security Studies, *The AU-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur: A Force Commander Perspective on the Pitfalls, Challenges and Prospects of Mandate Implementation in a Complex Mission*, Pretoria, 1 October 2008.

³² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 595 – 596.

³³ In 2005, John Garang - the charismatic leader of SPLA/M – died in a helicopter crash.

³⁴ Festus Aboagye, The hybrid operation for Darfur: a critical review of the concept of the mechanism, 2.

³⁵ Institute of Security Studies, The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur: Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training, Pretoria, South Africa, November 2007.

³⁶ United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.